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A B S T R A C T * • •
We use detailed cohort data from three surveys of graduates to examine
two explanations for the large decline in the male-female wage gap that
occurred in the United Kingdom during the early 1970s. The first attri-
butes the fall to gender-specific factors, most notably the introduction of
antidiscrimination legislation. The second explanation argues that these
changes were largely in respon.'ie to changes in the wage structure and
in particular to the introduction of income policies. Our findings show
that for U.K. graduates, all the change in relative wages that occurred
in this period can be accounted for by gender-specific forces.
I. Introduction
There have been several important changes in the relative labor
market conditions faced by women in the United Kingdom over the last 30 years.
The most notable of these changes has been the shift in relative pay in favor of
female workers that occurred in the 1970s. Recent work by Sloane and Theodos-
siou (1994) has shown that this reduction in the wage gap occurred throughout
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Figure 1
Female-Male Weekly Wage Ratio for Full-Time Workers
Source: N.E.S.
Note: The series break in 1983. This is because previous to 1983 the
data refer to males aged 21 and over and females aged 18 and over.
Aflcr 1983. the data refer to adult males and females. The series
overlap for 1983 as shown in Figure 1.
the wage distribution, with the female-male earnings ratio for nonmanual workers
rising by 17.5 percent at the mean, 16.18 percent at the 10th percentile, and 20.07
percent at the 90th percentile. Further evidence of the widespread nature of these
changes is given in Figure 1. which plots the female-male wage ratio for manual
and nonmanual workers. Again we see that the wage ratio rose for both groups
of workers in the 1970s (from about 0.50 in 1970 to 0.61 in 1983) and stabilized
thereafter.'
While time-series and aggregate data can inform us about the general nature of
these changes, they are not particularly useful in helping to identify their causes
and consequences. The present study uses detailed cohort data from three com-
prehensive national surveys of U.K. graduates to study these changes over the
1967 to 1986 period.
Although our analysis is limited to graduates, Figure 1 shows that the trend in
I. There is some evidence that this ratio is increasing again in the 1990s.
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the male-feniale wage gap is similar for manual and nonmanual workers, which
suggests that similar forces are operating on both groups. Looking at the trends
in the wage gap for qualified workers may in itself be insightful given the growing
concern over the failure of women to progress through their professions, due
perhaps to a "glass ceiling" at senior ranks. Furthermore, highly qualified women
have an importance beyond their numbers. This is partly due to the fact that
women in senior positions are better placed to look after the work interests of
other women in their organization. In addition, the absence of female role models
in positions of authority may affect female students' motivations and aspirations
and hence further compound any problems that may already exist (Kahn 1993).
It is for these reasons that we believe that our study, although restricted to
qualified workers, may have important policy implications.
Our analysis is particularly interesting in the U.K. context in that our data
relate to three cohorts who finished college, in I960, 1970. and 1980 (and about
whom we know details of their first six or seven years in the labor market). This
period was a crucially important time for female workers in the United Kingdom
since it coincides with the introduction ofthe Equal Pay Act in 1970 and the Sex
Discrimination Act in 1975, both of which aimed to improve the working condi-
tions of women. Having one cohort whose early labor market experience was
clearly prior to the legislation, one whose experience was during the first period
over which the legislation was being enacted, and one cohort whose experience
is clearly after the period of legislation, affords a unique opportunity to study in
some detail the possible effect of these acts on the wage prospects of qualified
women.
While the introduction of various antidiscrimination laws was clearly aimed at
reducing the male-female wage gap, the period 1967-86 was also a period during
which patterns of wage inequality changed substantially. Throughout the 1970s,
income policies had the effect of reducing the skill premia and thus lowering
inequality. In contrast, the absence of such policies in the 1980s, combined with
the rise in the skill premia resulting from changes in production technology
(Machin 1994) and patterns of international trade, has led to a substantial rise in
inequality over the last 15 years (Jenkins 1994).^
To distinguish the impact of changes in the wage structure from gender-specific
factors such as the Equal Pay Act, we adopt a procedure developed by Juhn,
Murphy, and Pierce (1991—referred to as JMP from here on) and adapted by
Blau and Kahn (1992) in their work on international gender pay differentials. This
procedure decomposes changes in the wage gap into a gender-specific component
and a wage-structure component. The gender-specific contribution to the wage
gap focuses on male-female differences in skills and on the differential treatment
of males and females with equal skills.^ The wage-structure component deals with
2. A more deiailed discussion ofthe antidiscrimination laws and income policies in place in the United
Kingdom over this period is given in Appendix 1,
3. The latter is normally associated with market discrimination: however, since discrimination laws can
also affect things such as access to education and training and thus difTcrences in skills, we will not
make this distinction. Rather we prefer to view discrimination as working through either of the above
channels, the important factor being that both are gender specific.
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more pervasive changes in the labor market that affect both males'and females,
such as changes in the return to education or experience. To the extent that
female workers are located at the lower end of the income distribution, any
changes that reduce/increase income inequality will favor/hurt female workers
disproportionately and thus lead to a fall/rise in the male-female wage gap.
The results of our paper show that for graduate workers, the decline in the
wage gap between 1967 and 1977 reflects changes in gender-specific forces. We
find no evidence that the changing wage structure served to reduce the male-
female wage gap for graduates. These findings suggest that, for our sample, the
fall in the male-female wage gap between 1967 and 1977 is more likely to reflect
legislation such as the Equal Pay Act or convergence in unobserved skills, rather
than imposed income policies or other wage-structure effects."* Furthermore, we
find that while the subsequent rise in inequality in the 1980s may have impeded
female progress, the reversal of the trend in the gender-specific components fur-
ther contributed to this decline. This is in contrast to the findings of Blau and
Kahn (1994). who report that over this period women in the United States were
"swimming upstream" in a labor market that was becoming increasingly unfavor-
able to low-wage workers.
U. The 1960, 1970, and 1980 Graduate Cohort Data
Three separate data sets relating to nonmedical graduates in the
United Kingdom have been used to obtain the estimates presented in this paper.
The first data set consists of a survey of graduates who completed their degrees
in 1960 and includes all women graduating in that year and a sample of one in
two men. The 1970 data set is a survey of one in flve individuals who graduated
in 1970. and the 1980 data set is a survey of approximately one in six individuals
graduating in 1980. All three surveys provide information on the first six or seven
years after graduation.
The first survey was conducted by the Department of Sociological Studies at
the University of Sheffield and funded by the Department of Education and Sci-
ence. The 1970 and 1980 surveys were carried out by the Department of Employ-
ment. Full details of the 1960, 1970, and 1980 surveys can be found in Kelsall,
Poole, and Kuhn (1970). Williamson (1981). and Dolton. Makepeace, and Inchley
(1992), respectively.
In this study we restrict our analysis to full-time workers aged less than 29 on
graduating, who were earning more than £2.000 and less than £100,000 a year in
1992 prices. The "full-time" restriction is not important for our sample in that a
very small proportion of men or women worked part-time six to seven years after
graduation. For each of the three cohorts, we use the Retail Price Index (RPI) to
deflate wages to 1985 prices. After excluding all incomplete records, the sample
sizes were 4,544 in 1960, 4,309 in 1970, and 4.656 in 1980. This set of surveys is
4. Zabalza and Tzaimatos (1983) reach & similar conclusion for the population as a whole using a different
approach.
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unique in that it contains similar information on three distinct cohorts covering
a twenty-year period. For our estimation, we have taken care to use, where
possible, only variables that have a similar definition and interpretation in all
three surveys. The data are also valuable in that they provide a measure of actual
labor market experience as opposed to potential experience, which is particularly
important when studying the behavior of female workers. The earnings variable
refers to current annual earnings at the time of the survey. Table Al provides
summary statistics for the variables used in this study.
III. Wage Structure and Gender DifTerentials
Several papers have used wage data from the 1970s and 1980s
along with standard wage decompositions to estimate the extent of wage discrimi-
nation in the United Kingdom, with varied results. Greenhalgh (1980), using data
from the General Household Survey, found that the unexplained differential could
be as large as 32 percent between married men and women but only 10 percent
between single men and women. Zabalza and Arrufat (1985) obtained estimates
of 13 percent for married men and women after controlling for sample selection.
Wright and Ermisch (1991) found a differential of around 20 percent for married
men and women using the Women in Employment survey. Smaller estimates
have been found with more specialized samples. Siebert and Sloane (1981) found
a differential of only 7 percent for single men and women within plants, while
Chiplin and Sloane (1976) estimated an unexplained differential of 4 percent for
professional workers in one plant. Siebert and Young (1983) found almost no
unexplained differential among librarians.
In this paper we extend these studies by using a wage decomposition procedure
developed by JMP to examine changes in the relative pay gap for qualified work-
ers in the United Kingdom between 1967 and 1986. Consider the following log
wage equations for men and women in cohort 0:
(1) W% = Xl&l+Vi
(2) Wf = X}^} + Vj,
where V? is the OLS residual with mean 0 and standard deviation c^, s = m,f.
Using the male price, we can define the residuals C/^  and Uj as follows:
(3) Ul = Wl,-Xl^i=Vi - .
(4) U}=W}Jl
Taking the average wage differential for cohort 0 we get
(5) AW" = WJ - H^ = AI^PS, - ^Ap«
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where
This decomposition, which was developed by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973).
decomposes the average wage gap between men and women into differences in
observed productivity evaluated at the male price'' and an unexplained or residual
component. Taking the difference in the average wage differential between two
cohorts we get
(6) AW" - AlV" = ( A F - A^)Pi , + AA (^|3;^  - |3^ ,) - (Uj - Vj).
The first term in (6) measures changes in the wage gap resulting from changes
in the observed productivity gap evaluated at the male market price. The second
term reflects the impact of observable changes in the wage structure on the aver-
age wage gap. In keeping with JMP (1991) and Blau and Kahn (1992, 1994) we
call this the "observable price effect." However, it is important to understand
that this term measures the impact of changes in returns to characteristics over
time and not differences between male and female rates of return. The third term
in brackets captures changes in the residual component over time and is generally
thought of as measuring changes in discrimination.
The results of this decomposition for our sample are provided in Table 1. The
first row shows the change in the actual wage gap over time, and Rows 2-4
provide the contribution of observable quantities, observable prices, and the re-
sidual term to these changes. Looking first at the actual wage gap we see that
the trend in our data is very similar to that documented in Figure I. In particular
we see that the average wage gap fell by over 10 percentage points between 1967
and 1977 and subsequently rose by about 3 percentage points between 1977 and
1986. Looking at the results of our decomposition in Rows 2-4 of Column 3, we
find that approximately 80 percent of the reduction in the wage gap between l%7
and 1977 can be explained by a reduction in the observed skill differential. The
residual component was also important over this period, explaining 41 percent
(0.043/0.106) of the fall in the wage gap. Column 4 shows that the residual compo-
nent can also account for over half of the rise in the wage gap between 1977 and
1986. Observable prices explain 25 percent of this increase.^
5. We should note that in implementing this decomposition we have Ihe standard index problem associ-
ated with these procedures. It is clear that our decomposition is based on the wage equation lor males,
and hence we are assuming that the male market reflects the nondiscriminatory labor markel. We could
repeat this analysis using the female equation or some weighted average of both the mak and female
equations. The economic implications associated with these choices are discussed further in Neumark
(1988) and Oaxaca and Ransom (1994).
6. The rise in the wage gap between 1977 and 1986 may be explained by the growth in the proportion
Of women amongst graduates. In 1960, 4.13 percent of women aged 20-24 in the United Kingdom
attended third level education. By 1970 this had risen to 9.5 percent and by 1980 had increased further
to 15 percent. The corresponding figures for men are 12.8 percent, 18.5 percent, and 24.9 percent,
respectively (these numbers were taken from yearbooks of the United Nations Educational. Scientific,
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)). However, as these data show, the growth in the supply of female
graduates relative to males was greater during the period in which we observe the large fall in the wage
gap. This suggests that our findings cannot be explained by supply-side factors alone.
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Table 1
Decomposition of the
Total
Observables
Unobservables
Wage Gap
Quantity
(AA"' - AA^)Pi,
Prices
AA'*'(|3J^  - p^)
Residual
-{U} - U}) •
(3)
1967-77
-0.106
-0.084
+ 0.021
-0.043
(4)
1977-86
0.032
0.006
0.008
0.018
The above results highlight the importance of the residual component in ex-
plaining movements in the male-female wage gap. This term is normally associ-
ated with discrimination. However, we can also think of it as consisting of a
gender-specific component and a wage-structure component. To see this we fol-
low JMP and rewrite our basic wage equation for male workers as
where
is a standardized residual with mean 0 and variance 1. Changes in a^ over time
reflect changes in within-group wage inequality.
Likewise we can rewrite the equation for female workers when paid according
to male prices as
(9) Wf =Xf^l, + CT^e^
where
^ " . / fM' J( 1 0 ) Q^f =
With this notation the average wage gap at a point in time for a given cohort 0
can be written as
(11) AW" = AAT^ p^  + CT°,Ae",
where the first term reflects the predicted movement in wages and the second
term reflects the residual component. The change in the male-female wage gap
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between two cohorts can now be written as
(12) AW" - ^ F J^ ^
The first two terms on the right-hand side of Equation (12) are the same as the
first two terms in Equation (6). while the last two terms reflect our decomposition
of the residual component. The third term captures changes in the relative posi-
tions of males and females in the conditional wage distribution. As with JMP and
Blau and Kahn, we call this the "gap effect": it measures the change in the wage
gap that would occur if inequality remained the same and only the relative posi-
tions within the distribution changed. The fourth term captures the effect of
changes in inequality on the wage gap, holding fixed the relative male and female
positions within the distribution. If women tended to be located at the lower end
of the distribution, an increase in o'„, will hurt them relative to the average male
worker. The first and third terms are the gender-specific contributions to the
changing wage gap, while the second and the fourth terms capture the impact of
a changing wage structure on the average male-female differential. If income
policies were reducing the wage gap, we would expect them to work through the
second term (by reducing p, the observed skill premium) or through the fourth
term (by reducing CT. the unobserved skill premium).
The empirical calculation of the third and fourth terms merits further discus-
sion. The basic premise behind this approach is that one can identify a "male
comparable" for female workers in terms of both observed and unobserved char-
acteristics and that the same forces will determine both the wage of a female
worker and her comparable mate worker. To find the comparable male worker,
we assign each woman in cohort 1 a percentile number based on the ranking of
her wage residual (9^ ) in the distribution of male residuals. For instance, if the
median female in year 1 corresponds to the plh percentile of the male residual
distribution, her comparable male worker would be the pth percentile male. This
is shown diagrammatically as point B in Figure 2. The final two terms in (12) can
both be thought of in terms of this comparable male worker. The third term, the
gap effect, captures how the comparable male worker has changed over time. To
continue with our example, we use the male residual distribution for cohort 0 to
find where the pih percentile male worker is {point C in Figure 2). We then
compare this number (C) with the actual median female residual in period 0 (point
A in Figure 2). The average of these differences across female workers {C -
A) is called the gap effect. Since we are using the year-0 distribution for both
computations, the difference reflects the movement of women up or down a
stationary distribution. Clearly if women's positions within the male residual
distribution remain unchanged over time, then C will equal A and the gap effect
will be zero. If. however, women have improved over time, then C will be greater
than A and the gap effect will contribute to a fall in the male-female wage gap.
Such a change can reflect either a reduction in market discrimination or a conver-
gence in unobservable skills.
The fourth term, the unobservable price effect, keeps the comparable worker
fixed and examines how this worker fared over time as result of changes in
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OfO Ufl
p% of year 0
male distribution
Figure 2
Decomposition of Residuals
the residual distribution. Again continuing with our example, we know that the
comparable male corresponding to the median female in period 1 is the pth per-
centile male (B). To calculate the unobservabie price effect we compare the pth
percenlile of the male distribution in period 0 (point C in Figure 2) to where the
actual median female worker is in period 1 (point B in Figure 2). Since we are
holding the position in both distributions fixed (at the /?th percentile) and allowing
the distributions to change, the average of these differences {B - C) reflects
gains or losses suffered by females as a result of changes in within-group inequal-
ity, measured here as changes in CT, the money value of the per-unit difference
in the standardized residual. In keeping with previous work we call this the
unobservabie price effect.
The results of the above decomposition are presented in Table 2. The top panel
summarizes the performance of females relative to males over this period. The
first row shows the actual male-female wage differentials which again highlight
the large fall in the 1970s and the reversal of this trend in the 1980s. The second
row shows the residual wage gap. Even after controlling tor human capital, sector
of employment, and personal characteristics, we still find a wage gap of 15, 10,
and 12 log points in 1967, 1977, and 1986, respectively. This is also reflected in
Row 3, which shows the comparable male for the median female in the residual
distribution. Comparing the three columns, we see an improvement in the relative
position of the average female between 1967 and 1977 (moving from the 30th
percentile to the 36th percentiie) and a subsequent reversal between 1977 and
1986 (moving back to the 33rd percentile). In spite of the improvement between
1967 and 1986, however, the fact that women are still located in the lower tail of
the residual distribution suggests that changes in within-group inequality may
influence the male-female wage gap over time.
The lower panel of Table 2 shows the results of our decomposition of the wage
gap. Columns 3 and 4 show the changes from 1967 to 1977 and 1977 to 1986,
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Table 2
JMP Decomposition of the
Log wage differential
Mean female residual
Mean female percentile
in male residual distri-
bution
Decomposition of the
change in the differ-
ential
Total
Observables
• > ;
Unobservables
•
Gender specific
Wage structure
Wage Gap
Observed A"s
(AA" - A^")pi,
Observed prices
^x^^l - 32.)Gap
(A9' - Ae'')cr;t,
Unobservable prices
Ae^a;, - a2,)
(3)
1967
0.289
-0.146
0.30
1967-77
-0.106
-0.084
-1-0.021
-0.042
-O.OOI
-0.126
0.02
(4)
1977
0.183
-0.103
0.36
1977-86
0.032
0.006
0.008
0.017
0.001
0.023
0.009
(5)
1986
0.215
-0.121
0.33
(4) - (3)
0.138
0.09
-0.013
0.059
0.000
0.149
-0.011
respectively. The fifth column reports the difference between Columns 4 and
3 and measures the contribution of each component to the slowdown in wage
convergence in the 1980s. Again the results suggest that gender-specific factors
account for the entire fall in the wage gap between 1967 and 1977. In particular,
almost all of the residual gap identified in Table I reflects movements up the
distribution rather than changes in the shape of the distribution. We find no
evidence that the wage structure contributed to the reduction in the relative pay
of men and women over this period. If income policies were responsible for the
reduction in the wage gap during the 1970s, we would expect this to show up in
either the observable or unobservable price effects. The fact that we find no
evidence of this suggests that income policies were relatively unimportant in
reducing the wage gap for our sample.'
7. Since equal pay waN introduced much earlier in Ihe public sector than in the private sector, we have
also carried out this analysis for the public sector separately. Our iindings show that the residual wage
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As illustrated in Column 4 there was a substantial reduction in the rate at which
the wage gap fell in the late 1970s, and by 1986 it had actually begun to increase
again. This period corresponds very closely to that studied by Blau and Kahn
(1994) in which they found that the changing wage structure acted as an impedi-
ment to female progress. Unlike their results where the gender-specific effects
counteracted the wage-structure effects, however, our findings for U.K. gradu-
ates show that female workers fell further behind men in an environment that
was becoming more unfavorable. One possible explanation for this is that the
unobserved skill gap between males and females stabilized over this period. An-
other explanation is that while the legislation may have succeeded in providing
equal pay for equal work,** if qualified women hit a "glass ceiling" as they at-
tempted to progress through the ranks of their profession, a failure to eliminate
this barrier would have meant that there was only so far women could have
progressed.' A recent study by Gregg and Machin (1993) that examined data
on approximately 29,000 top executives in 533 U.K.-based companies provides
support for the existence of a "glass ceiling" blocking the promotion of women
to the highest jobs. They found that after controlling for various characteristics,
women were less likely to gain promotion than their male counterparts. By 1992
only five out of 1,370 managing directors or chief executives of U.K.-quoted
companies were women (Gregg and Machin 1993). Similar concerns have been
voiced in the United States regarding the role of women in professional occupa-
tions. For example, Kahn (1993), in a study of women in the economics profes-
sion, concludes that the major hurdle for women in academia is obtaining tenure.
One could argue that we find no wage-structure effect because our sample is
restricted to graduates. For changes in inequality to have a significant impact on
the wage gap, we need to have sufficient variation in the residual distribution so
that changes in inequality are meaningful, and we also need women to be located
in the lower tail ofthe male distribution. It is possible that both these conditions
are less likely to be true among graduates than among the population as a whole.
To examine the extent to which this is true, we use Sweep 5 of the National
Child Development Survey (NCDS) to compare wage distributions for graduates
and the population as a whole. The NCDS is a continuing longitudinal data set
following the lives of all those born in Britain between March 3 and March 9,
1958. To date there have been five followup surveys of these individuals, taking
gap was lower in the public sector than in Ihe private sector, which is lo be expected, given the earlier
introduction of equal pay. Our findings again suggest that most of the forces al work in this sector were
gender specific, reflecting either a continuance of the affirmative action legislation or other gender-
specific forces such as changes in women's attitudes to work. Again we find no evidence of a wage-
structure effect and hence limited support for the income policy argumeni,
8. Looking at the differential in starting salaries, which avoids issues of differing promotion profiles for
men and women, we find that the wage gap fell from 0,17 in l%6 to 0.08 in 1977 and remained at this
level in 1986. However, we musi be cautious in interpreting these numbers since the starting salary for
I960 is based on a question concerning wage in first job. It is not clear whether the respondent reported
his/her starting wage or most recent wage in this job.
9. Although workers in our sample have at most seven years tenure, it is still possible that important
promotion decisions have already been made or arc about to be made at this stage.
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place in 1%5 (age 7), 1969 (age 11), 1974 (age 16), 1981 (age 23), and 1991 (age
33).
To compare the wage distributions, we estimate wage equations for graduates
and the population as a whole using specifications as close as possible to those
used in this paper. The NCDS graduates would have graduated in about 1978,
which is after the equal-pay legislation. To do the comparison, we use earnings
from Sweep 5 (1991). The wage differentials are 0.31 and 0.24 for the whole
population and graduates, respectively. The figure for graduates is similar to the
estimate of 0.22 we obtained for our graduates in 1986. The standard deviation
of male graduate earnings is 0.34, which, although slightly smaller, is quite close
to that of the whole population (0.38). In the residual distribution we find that
the comparable male for the average female is about the 26th percentile for the
graduates versus the 18th percentile for the whole population.'" While this indi-
cates a potential for greater wage-structure effects in the population as a whole,
even for graduates, the median woman is still well below the median male. This
suggests that the graduate data contain sufficient dispersion in wages and also
sufficient differences between men and women to enable us to identify wage-
structure effects if they were present.
IV. Conclusion
In this paper we decompose changes in the male-female wage gap
between cohorts into gender-specific effects and wage-structure effects. We eval-
uate the relative importance of factors such as equal-pay legislation and govern-
ment-imposed flat-rate income policies on the U.K. gradtiate labor market. To
our knowledge this is the first attempt to use individual data to analyze directly
the channels through which income policies are thought to affect the male-female
wage gap. Our results suggest that changes in income policies had little impact
on the male-female wage gap for graduates between 1967-1977. We find that ait
of the decline in the wage gap for graduates over this period was the result of
gender-specific forces that reflect either the impact of equal-pay legislation or a
convergence in unobservable skills. Furthermore, we find that changes in the
gender-specific components were the most important factors in accounting for
the slowdown in wage convergence among graduates in the 1980s. One explana-
tion for this is the possible limited effectiveness of the antidiscrimination legisla-
tion in providing equal opportunity for men and women. In particular, our results
suggest that while women and men may enter occupations on the same terms,
women find it harder to advance through the ranks. Any further attempt to im-
prove the position of females in the labor market should carefully address this
issue.
10. This is a point-in-time analysis and ideally we would like to examine how these estimates were
changing over time. Unfortunately the NCDS has no comparable predecessor suitable for this exercise
that is publicly accessible. Those data sets that do have a temporal aspect do not have sutficicnl data
(for example, the New Earnings Survey (NES) has no education data while the General Household
Survey (GHS) and the Family Expenditure Survey (FES) do not contain an accurate measure of experi-
ence). • '
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Appendix 1
Legislation
Discrimination Legislation
The most important pieces of discrimination legislation introduced in the United
Kingdom during this period were the 1970 Equal Pay Act and the 1975 Sex
Discrimination Act. The former act gave employers five years to adapt and pay
male and female employees the same wage for the same or broadly similar work
or for work regarded as equivalent under a job evaluation study. The second act
required equal treatment in other aspects of employment conditions, for example,
promotion. In addition, the 1983 Equal Value (Amendment) Regulations made
provisions for employees to claim equal pay for work of equal value.
Income Policies
During the 1970s the U.K. government implemented an income policy aimed at
limiting wage inflation. For instance, between April 1973 and November 1973 the
income policy placed a limit of 4 percent plus £1 on income growth, with a £5
maximum. Between November 1973 and August 1974 the income policy stipulated
a minimum and a maximum for income growth of £2.25 and £7, respectively (see
Dex and Sloane 1988).
Table Al
Summary Statistics for the Three Working Cohorts (standard errors
in parentheses)
Sample size
AGE
ALEVEL
CHILD
CLASMIS
COMMERCE
DEGREE!
DEGREE2
Males
1960
3.335
348.2
(0.27)
9.48
(0.05)
0.48
(0.01)
0.04
(0.003)
0.06
(0.004)
0.30
(0.01)
0.34
(0.01)
Females
1960
1.209
339.0
(0.31)
10.1
(0.08)
0,06
(0.01)
0.03
(0.01)
0.03
(0.004)
0.23
(0.01)
0.36
(0.01)
Males
1970
3.537
354.9
(0.24)
8.1
(0.07)
0.40
(O.OI)
0,04
(0.003)
0.10
(0.01)
0.31
(0.01)
0.37
(0.01)
Females
1970
772
348.1
(0.39)
9.5
(0.13)
0.06
(0.01)
0.03
(0.01)
0.07
(0.01)
0.31
(0.02)
0.41
(0.02)
Males
1980
2.993
344.2
(0.25)
7.9
(0.08)
0.19
(0.01)
0.05
(0.003)
0.22
(0.01)
0.37
(0.01)
0.39
(0.01)
Females
1980
1,663
341.2
(0.28)
7.8
(0,09)
0.07
(0.01)
0.04
(0.004)
0.19
(0.01)
0.35
(0.01)
0.42
(0.01)
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Table AI (continued)
ED VCAT
ENGINEER
FATHPROF
FATHSKIL
FTSTUD
INST
JOBS
LANGUAGE
LOG SALARY
MA
MARRIED
OTHER
OTHERS
PHD
PROF
PRVPROF
PUBLIC
REGIONC
SCHOOL
SCIENCE
SOCIAL
WORK
WORK2
Males
I960
0.39
(0,01)
0.19
(0.01)
0.43
(0.01)
0.45
(0.01)
14.01
(0.28)
—
2.33
(0.02)
0.09
(0.005)
9.24
(0.01)
0.06
(0.0031
0.74
(0.01)
0.09
(0.005)
0.09
(0.01)
(0.0!)
0.15
(0.01)
0.06
(0.004)
0.10
(0.01)
O.Il
(0.01)
0.23
(0.01)
0.32
(0.01)
0.19
(0.01)
61.5
(0.29)
4,072.1
(30.7)
Females
1960
0.66
(0.01)
0.002
(0.001)
0.47
(0.01)
0.42
(0.01)
9.43
(0.32)
—
2.43
(0.03)
0.17
(0.01)
8.96
(0.01)
0.03
(0,01)
0.47
(0.01)
0,23
(0.01)
0.09
(0.01)
0.04
(0.01)
0.11
(0.01)
0.01
(0.003)
0.15
(0.01)
0,18
(0.01)
0.15
(0.01)
0.23
(0.01)
0.13
(0.01)
59.9
(0.39)
3,802.2
(39.4)
Males
1970
0.19
(0.01)
0.25
(0.01)
0.56
(0.01)
0.34
(0.01)
14.5
(0.28)
0.33
(0.01)
2.27
(0.02)
0.05
(0.003)
9.30
(0.01)
0.06
(0.004)
0.74
(O.oi)
0.12
(O.OI)
0.07
(0.004)
0.08
(0.004)
0.20
(0.01)
0.08
(0.004)
0.23
(0.01)
0.23
(0.007)
0.13
(0.01)
0.33
(0.01)
0.20
(0.01)
67.56
(0.29)
4.862.7
(33.9)
Females
1970
0.45
(0.02)
0.01
(0.004)
0.66
(0.02)
0.28
(0.02)
14.97
(0.49)
0.16
(0.01)
2.56
(0.05)
0,22
(0.01)
9.11
(O.OI)
0.06
(0.01)
0.63
(0.02)
0.16
(0.0!)
0.08
(0.01)
0.04
(0.01)
0.19
(0.01)
0.03
(O.OI)
0.27
(0.02)
0.31
(0.02)
0.10
(O.OI)
0.30
(0.02)
0.22
(0.01)
66.4
(0.53)
4,626.4
(61.4)
Males
1980
0.12
(O.OI)
0.21
(O.OI)
0.59
(O.OI)
0.31
(O.OI)
11.8
(0.25)
0.30
(O.OI)
2.11
(0.02)
0.04
(0.003)
9.44
(O.OI)
0.07
(0.004)
0.53
(0.01)
0.15
(0.01)
0.07
(0.005)
0.06
(0.004)
0.24
(0.01)
0.16
(O.OI)
0.15
(0.01)
0.26
(O.OI)
0.13
(O.OI)
0.27
(0.01)
0.27
(O.OI)
65.27
(0.26)
4.465.3
(28.5)
Females
1980
0.30
(0.01)
0.02
(0.003)
0.65
(0.01)
0.27
(0.01)
10.11
(0.28)
0.36
(O.OI)
2.39
(0.03)
0.15
(0.01)
9.23
(0.01)
0.06
(0.006)
0.54
(O.OI)
0.26
(0.01)
0.11
(O.OI)
0.03
(0.004)
0.21
(O.OI)
0.11
(0.01)
0.16
(0.01)
0.28
(O.OI)
0.08
(O.OI)
0.22
(0,01)
0.25
(0.01)
63.8
(0.31)
4,235.9
(34.5)
Table A2
Description of Variables Used
if the degree is an upper second or higher,
if the degree is a middle or lower second,
if the individual works in the education
AGE Age of individual in months.
ALEVEL Number of Alevel points up to a maximum of 15, where
Grade A is awarded five points; Grade B. four points;
Grade C, three points; Grade D, two points; and Grade E,
one point. Actual Alevel grades were not reported in the
1960 survey. The number of Alevels taken and passed is
scaled up to provide a proxy for the actual points score.
CHILD Takes the value of I if the individual has a child.
CLASMIS Takes a value of 1 if social class missing.
COMMERCE Takes a value of I if the individual works in the commercial
sector.
DEGREE! Takes a value of
DEGREE2 Takes a value of
EDUCAT Takes a value of
sector.
ENGINEER Takes a value of 1 if the degree subject is engineering.
FATHFROF Takes a value of 1 if the individual's father was a profes-
sional worker.
FATHSKIL Takes a value of 1 if the individual's father was a skilled, non-
manual worker.
FTSTUD Months of full-time academic study since first degree.
INST Takes a value of 1 if the individual attended a polytechnic.
JOBS Number of jobs since graduating.
LANGUAGE Takes a value of 1 if degree subject is languages.
LOG SALARY Log of annual salary measured in 1985 prices.
MA Takes a value of 1 if the individual has a master's degree.
MARRIED Takes a value of I if the individual was ever married.
OTHER Takes a value of 1 if the degree subject is other (Arts is refer-
ence group).
OTHERS Takes a value of 1 if the individual works in some other sec-
tor (industrial sector is the reference group).
PHD Takes a value of 1 if the individual has a Ph.D.
PROF Takes a value of 1 if the individual has a professional qualifi-
cation.
PRVPROF Takes a value of 1 if the individual works in the professional
sector (includes lawyers, architects, etc.; doctors are not in
this sample).
PUBLIC Takes a value of 1 if the individual works in the public sec-
tor.
REGIONC Takes a value of 1 if the individual lives in the London re-
gion.
SCHOOL Takes a value of 1 if the individual attended public school.
SCIENCE Takes a value of 1 if the degree subject is science.
SOCIAL Takes a value of 1 if degree subject is social science.
WORK Actual work experience in months.
W0RK2 Work squared.
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